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Abstract: Publicly provided long-term care (LTC) insurance with means-tested ben-
efits is suspected to crowd out either private LTC insurance (Brown and Finkelstein
2008. The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term
Care Insurance Market. American Economic Review 98(3):1083–102), private saving
(Gruber and Yelowitz 1999. Public Health Insurance and Private Saving. Journal
of Political Economy 107(6):1249–74; Sloan and Norton 1997. Adverse Selection,
Bequests, Crowding Out, and Private Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the
Long-term Care Insurance Market. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 15:201–19), or
informal care (Pauly 1990. The Rational Non-purchase of Long-term Care Insurance.
Journal of Political Economy 95:153–68; Zweifel and Strüwe 1998. Long-term Care
Insurance in a Two-generation Model. Journal of Risk and Insurance 65(1):13–32).
This contribution predicts crowding-out effects for both private LTC insurance and
informal care on the one hand and private saving and informal care on the other.
These effects result from the interaction of a parent who decides about private LTC
insurance before retirement and the amount of saving in retirement and a caregiver
who decides about effort devoted to informal care. Some of the predictions are tested
using a recent survey from China.
Keywords: long-term care, insurance, saving, crowding out, means testing, China
JEL Classification: D19, H51, J14
1 Introduction and Motivation
Long-term care (LTC) services are costly, causing elderly citizens to face the risk
of ending up in poverty unless they receive support from their families or the
government. In spite of evidence suggesting an improved degree of control over
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health status also at high age (Schoder and Zweifel 2011), the risk of needing LTC
is expected to rise in just about all industrial countries due to increased long-
evity (Colombo et al. 2011). While several of them integrated LTC into their social
insurance schemes, nursing home use continues to be publicly subsidized sub-
ject to means testing, making wealthy recipients pay a higher share of its cost.
Yet public subsidization (by U.S. Medicaid) has been shown to crowd out private
LTC insurance by Brown and Finkelstein (2008). In addition, parent’s incentive
to save for old age may be weakened, as found by Gruber and Yelowitz (1999),
again in the case of U.S. Medicaid.
However, these crowding-out effects are not limited to the behavior of older
individuals subject to the risk of needing LTC (“parents” henceforth). They may also
characterize the behavior of potential caregivers (“children” henceforth), as argued
already by Pauly (1990) and empirically confirmed e.g. by Sloan and Norton (1997).
The causal nexus is the bequest, which is preserved if the child makes effort to keep
the parent out of the nursing home (Zweifel and Strüwe, 1998). However, this means
that crowding-out effects need to be modeled as the outcomes of an interaction
between two players, as recognized by Courbage and Zweifel (2011).
The present contribution purports to fill a gap in the existing literature. While
crowding out has been studied either with regard to private LTC insurance or saving
on the parent side and of informal care on the child side, this paper considers the
possibility of a “triple crowding out” induced by means-tested public subsidization
of LTC. In addition, it presents some empirical evidence coming from China with its
one-child policy, causing it to closely match the theoretical development which is
in terms of one parent and one child for simplicity.
The interaction between the parent and the child is modeled as a non-
cooperative game. Both parties commit ex ante, i.e. before the need for formal
LTC services arises. The parent chooses the amount of private LTC coverage
rather early in his or her active life. In view of the increasing tendency
of private insurers to combine LTC coverage with life or pension insurance
(which is contracted at young age), this is a realistic assumption (Banthrope
2013; De Montesquieu 2013). For instance, Schonbee (2013) notes that U.S. life
insurance policies often contain so-called riders (provisions for extra cover-
age), 23% of which currently are for LTC expenditure. When approaching
retirement, the parent sets a saving propensity which is not to be changed
anymore. This timing is realistic, too since most individuals are able to achieve
substantial savings only shortly before retirement, when children have left the
household.
However, these decisions are made in view of the child’s (expected) effort
which serves to reduce the probability of needing formal care, in particular,
admission to a nursing home. In turn, the child decides how much informal care
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to provide in response to the parent’s private LTC coverage and saving, which
determine the amount of wealth available for the bequest. Parental altruism is
reflected by the fact that final wealth is bequeathed in its entirety; child altru-
ism, by a loss of utility when the parent is in the nursing home. Comparative
statics are used to derive the slopes of the reaction functions, whose intersec-
tions define a set of Nash equilibria. Exogenous influences displace the equili-
brium, permitting to predict changes in outcomes in terms of both LTC insurance
and saving on the one hand and informal care on the other hand, providing
guidance as to where to expect crowding-out effects.
One crucial finding is a puzzling empirical confirmation of previous theore-
tical work. Courbage and Zweifel (2011), associating admission to a nursing
home with a severing of family ties inducing unstable outcomes, arrived at the
prediction that an exogenous increase in parental wealth (a very likely devel-
opment in China) causes a crowding out of private LTC insurance but a bene-
ficial crowding in of child effort. The present work takes into account that the
absence of subsidization of LTC expenditure in China implies the absence of
means testing of public LTC provision. It predicts a beneficial crowding in of LTC
coverage combined with an ambiguous effect on child effort. Yet, the evidence
from China points to a crowding-out effect on LTC coverage combined with a
crowding-in effect on child effort, lending support to Courbage and Zweifel
(2011). It is silent, however, regarding parents’ propensity to save.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in
Section 2. The Nash equilibria and their displacements caused by four exogenous
influences are derived in Section 3. Section 4 considers the displacements of the
Nash equilibria in the special case of China. The theoretical predictions are com-
pared to a recent (admittedly partial) survey from China in Section 5. The final
section is devoted to a summary and suggestions for policy and future research.
2 The Model
The parent P and the potential caregiver C (a child, but also a spouse, a relative
or a friend) are assumed to interact in the guise of non-cooperative game. First,
the decision problem of the parent is presented, followed by that of the child.
2.1 The Parent
Long before retirement, the parent decides about the amount of private insur-
ance I at a premium πI to top up publicly provided LTC insurance benefits.
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Increasingly, private life insurance and old-age provision policies (which are
contracted at a relatively early age) are sold in combination with LTC coverage
(Banthrope 2013). The LTC premium is not risk-rated because the insurer by
assumption is unable to predict the actual probability π eð Þ of needing formal
LTC, which depends on the effort exerted by the caregivere. Therefore,
πI =πeð1 + λÞI, with πe denoting an expected average value of π eð Þ and λ, a
proportional loading for administrative expense and risk bearing.
The parent is assumed to be rich enough to leave a bequest but poor
enough to obtain some public support which is means-tested – a likely case
in those countries that have introduced mandatory LTC insurance or added a
LTC component to their social security. Closer to retirement, he or she opts for
a propensity to save s, which determines the size of the bequest available to
the caregiver. This separation in time allows the decisions with regard to s and
I to be considered separately, greatly simplifying the analysis. The child selects
an amount of effort e that serves to reduce the probability π that the parent will
enter a nursing home, with π′ eð Þ < 0 and π″ eð Þ > 0, indicating decreasing mar-
ginal effectiveness of effort. Realistic restrictions are, π eð Þ < 1− π eð Þ and
jπ′ eð Þj <π eð Þ, i.e. need of formal LTC is a relatively rare event while the
marginal effectiveness of child effort is limited throughout.
The parent is characterized by a risk utility function defined over con-
sumption in the two pre-retirement periods, u1ð.Þ and u2ð.Þ, and over wealth in
a future period, all of unit length.1 During this post-retirement period, he or
she faces the risk of spending the rest of his or her life in a nursing home.
Accordingly, the parent’s utility function is conditioned on being in [υi ð Þ] or
out of the nursing home [υo ð Þ]. Utility when out of the nursing home is higher
than when in the home, i.e. υo > υi, reflecting the greater degree of indepen-
dence in the enjoyment of his or her wealth. This ranking is assumed to hold
across the levels of wealth to be considered (wealth when out of the nursing
home is higher than when in since the parent must share in the cost of LTC). It
also holds for the marginal utility of wealth, i.e. υ′o > υ′i, again across the
variation of wealth associated with LTC status. There are three justifications
for this assumption. First, it is in accordance with Evans and Viscusi (1991) and
Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2009), who find empirical evidence
1 Contrary to the two pre-retirement periods, the post-retirement utility function has wealth and
not consumption as its argument in order to model the bequest motive of the elderly while
taking into account the fact that the bequest serves as an instrument for influencing child
behavior. Introducing second−period consumption as a ecision variable would complicate the
analysis without producing important insights.
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suggesting that bad health goes along not only with reduced wealth but also
a reduced marginal utility of wealth. Admission to a nursing home is usually
caused by a deterioration of health. Second, relative risk aversion is known
to strongly increase with age (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001). Since admission
to a nursing home goes along with a substantial fall in remaining life expec-
tancy (Zweifel et al., 1999), a parent in the home can be said to be older than
when continuing to live independently. Denoting RiR : = ð− u″i=u′iÞ  wi as
the coefficient of relative risk aversion “when in” and RoR : = ð− u″o=u′oÞ  wo
“when out”, respectively, one therefore has ðu″o=u′oÞ  wo < ðu″i=u′iÞ  wi . This
implies ðu′o=woÞ=u″o  > ðu′i=wiÞ=u″i  and hence u′o=u′iÞ  > 1 = ðu″owoÞ=ðu″iwiÞ .
This inequality holds unless u″o < < u″i (for which there is no particular reason)
because wo >wi in view of parental cost sharing. Third, this separation of
insurance and saving decisions in time simplifies the analysis considerably
compared e.g. to Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984) and Meier (1996), who more-
over consider only one decision-maker rather than the interaction of two.
The parent is altruistic in the sense that final wealth becomes a bequest
for the child in its entirety. Since the parent is assumed to be retired, there is
no labor income that could contribute to his or her wealth. Therefore, final
wealth if in the nursing home is given by initial wealth saved w0s accrued for
interest (1 + i) plus the benefit from private insurance benefit net of premium
I − πI = Ið1− πÞ minus a share r in LTC expenditure; since time in the nursing
home is normalized to one, this expenditure corresponds to the price of LTC p,
while π denotes one-third of the total LTC premium paid. We assume p > 1
because nursing homes are expensive compared to the other goods and services
that can be financed with wealth. The share r(.) of LTC expenditure is an
increasing function of total wealth at the time of admission, reflecting the fact
that public LTC benefits are means-tested in most countries, with private LTC
benefits not exempted (Brown and Finkelstein 2008).
This function also depends on a parameter α, with dα > 0 representing an
increased level of cost sharing and dα < 0, an increase in subsidization of LTC. If
the parent remains out of the nursing home, final wealth is simply given by
w0sð1 + iÞ. Note that s is set prior to admission to the nursing home, constituting
a commitment on the part of a parent who does not change his or her lifestyle
anymore. In all, one has for expected utility (EU) of the parent over the current
and the future period,
EU = u1 w0 − πI½  + u2 w0ð1− sÞ− πI½ 
+ πðeÞυi w0sð1 + iÞ+ Ið1− πÞ− rðw0sð1 + iÞ+ Ið1− πÞ, αÞ  p½ 
+ ð1−πðeÞÞυo w0sð1 + iÞ− πI½ .
[1]
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This formulation assumes that private insurance benefits received Ið1− πÞ are
not exempted when the amount of cost sharing is calculated by the public
authorities. From eq. [1], one can derive the first-order condition (FOC) for an
interior optimum with respect to the parent’s purchase of private LTC coverage,
dEU
dI
= − π u′1ð.Þ+ u′2ð.Þ
 
+πðeÞ ð1− πÞ − r′wð1− πÞp
   υ′ið.Þ− ð1− πðeÞÞπ  υ′oð.Þ
= − π u′1ð.Þ+ u′2ð.Þ
 
+πðeÞð1− πÞð1− r′wpÞ  υ′ið.Þ− ð1− πðeÞÞπ  υ′oð.Þ=0 .
[2]
The notation using total rather than partial differentials is designed to recall that
only one decision is made at a time. Eq. [2] can be interpreted in the following
way. In the pre-retirement period, additional coverage has the downside of
costing a higher premium according to the (augmented) probability of nursing
home admission π, which is valued according to the parent’s marginal utility of
consumption. It has the additional downside of costing the higher premium also
if the parent does not enter the nursing home, which is valued by the marginal
utility “when out”, υ′o. However, with probability πðeÞ, the parent is admitted to
a nursing home, at which time private insurance pays ð1− πÞ extra for each dollar
of extra coverage, which is valued using the marginal utility “when in”, υ′i. In an
optimum, these marginal costs and benefits must balance.
Let this optimum be disturbed by an increase in effort on the part of the
child, de > 0. Since the FOC is satisfied after the change as well, one has the so-
called comparative static equation,
∂2EU
∂I2
dI +
∂2EU
∂I∂e
de =0 [3]
In a maximum, marginal expected utility must decrease, i.e. ∂2EU=∂I2 < 0.
Therefore, the sign of dI=de is determined by ∂2EU=∂I∂e,
sgn
dI
de
 
= sgn −
∂2EU=∂I∂e
∂2EU=∂I2
 
= sgnð∂2EU=∂I∂eÞ . [4]
However, in view of eqs [2] and [1], one has
∂2EU
∂I∂e
=π′ðeÞð1− πÞð1− r′wpÞ  υ′ið.Þ+ π′ðeÞπ  υ′oð.Þ
= π′ðeÞ ð1− πÞð1− r′wpÞ  υ′ið.Þ+ π  υ′oð.Þ
 
.
Using the FOC of eq. [2] to obtain ð1− πÞð1− r′wpÞ  υ′ið.Þ= 1=πðeÞ π u′1ð.Þ+ u′2ð.Þ
 
+ ð1− πðeÞÞπ  υ′oð.Þg, this can be simplified to become
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∂2EU
∂I∂e
=π′ðeÞ=πðeÞ π u′1ð.Þ+ u′2ð.Þ
 
+ ð1− πðeÞÞπ  υ′oð.Þ +π′ðeÞπ  υ′oð.Þ 
= π′ðeÞ=πðeÞ π u′1ð.Þ+ u′2ð.Þ
 
+ π −πðeÞπ +π′ðeÞπ   υ′oð.Þ 
= π  π′ðeÞ=πðeÞ u′1ð.Þ+ u′2ð.Þ
 
+ 1− πðeÞ+π′ðeÞ   υ′oð.Þ 
< 0 since π′ðeÞ < 0 while π′ðeÞ  is small compared to 1−πðeÞ.
[5]
Equation [5] is proportional to the slope dI=de of the parent’s first reaction function
[see panel (a) of Figure 1 below]. With π′ðeÞ ! 0  due to decreasing marginal
effectiveness of effort [π″ðeÞ > 0], this function is concave from below.
As to the parent’s propensity to save (focusing again on interior solutions with
0 < s < 1),
dEU
ds
= −w0u′2ð.Þ+ πðeÞw0 ð1 + iÞð1− r′wpÞ
   υ′ið.Þ+ ð1−πðeÞÞw0ð1 + iÞ  υ′oð.Þ
= − u′2ð.Þ+ ð1 + iÞ πðeÞð1− r′wpÞ  υ′ið.Þ+ ð1− πðeÞÞ  υ′oð.Þ
 
=0
[6]
after division by w0, with r′w denoting the partial derivative of the cost-sharing
parameter r with respect to parental wealth. Equation [6] can be interpreted as
follows. The first term corresponds to the certain loss of utility caused by forgone
consumption. The first term in brackets reflects the probability-weighted mar-
ginal benefit of additional saving in terms of wealth in the nursing home. It is
positive if r′wp < 1 or r
′
w < 1=p, respectively (recall that p > 1 by assumption),
indicating lenient means testing. Conversely, if means testing of LTC is very
(lenient cost sharing) 
F 
e
G
0 
(a) (b)
P
I
C 
F 
e
G
0
P
s C
1 
Figure 1: Nash equilibria. (a) in (I, e)-space (b) in (s, e)-space.
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stringent (r′w close to one), this term is negative; the parent will regret to have
saved to the detriment of consumption. Note that this may be the unexpected
side effect of a policy that makes cost sharing dependent on wealth, disregard-
ing the relative price of LTC. For instance, if LTC is twice as expensive as other
goods and services (p= 2), a value r′w > 0.5 suffices to induce this result. The
second term in brackets is unambiguously positive, making an interior solution
(which is amenable to comparative-static analysis) always possible.
In full analogy with eq. [3], the sign of the slope ds=de characterizing the
parent’s second reaction function is proportional to
∂2EU
∂s∂e
= ð1 + iÞ π′ðeÞð1− r′wpÞ  υ′ið.Þ−π′ðeÞÞ  υ′oð.Þ
 
= ð1 + iÞπ′ðeÞ − r′wp  υ′i + ðυ′i − υ′oÞ
 
> 0 since υ′i < υ′o.
[7]
The parent’s second reaction function therefore has positive slope. Moreover,
decreasing marginal effectiveness of effort [π″ eð Þ > 0] implies ds=de ! 0 for
e !∞ [see panel (b) of Figure 1 above].
2.2 The Child
The child (considered as the one caregiver here) also derives utility from final
wealth. In addition to his or her initial wealth z0, he or she can expect a bequest
amounting to a share kð1− tÞ of the parent’s final wealth, where t denotes the tax
rate on inheritance (which is assumed to be constant for simplicity). The share
rðw0sð1 + iÞ+ Ið1− πÞ, αÞ  p of LTC expenditure deducted from parental wealth
again increases with private insurance benefits received net of premium paid.2
During the pre-retirement period, the child is assumed to value his or her effort
with an opportunity cost θ per unit of time. For employed individuals, an
indicator of θ is the wage rate, which equals the foregone income of time
spent providing informal care; for retired individuals, θ > 0 indicates that they
could use their time for other activities of value. At the start of the second
period, he or she is assumed to enter retirement, with a concomitant drop in θ.
2 For simplicity, we abstract from the fact that in some countries (notably Germany), the child
may be called upon to contribute to the cost of LTC, resulting in a deduction from Z0 that
depends on Z0 (means testing) and p. For simplicity again, the model is in terms of one parent
and one child; otherwise, the optimal allocation of both bequest and caring effort between the
surviving spouse and the children would have to be determined.
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For simplicity, θ=0 is assumed. In the event that the parent stays out of the
nursing home, the bequest is larger because there is no share r of the cost of LTC
to be paid. Note that effort e is again set during the current period as a
commitment and aspect of lifestyle, not to be adjusted anymore in the two
future states in and out of the nursing home. Therefore, expected utility of the
child E U
 
reads,
E U = uðz0 − θeÞ+πðeÞυi½z0 + kð1− tÞfw0sð1 + iÞ+ Ið1− πÞ− rðw0sð1 + iÞ
+ Ið1− πÞ, αÞpg+ ð1− πðeÞÞυo½z0 + kð1− tÞfw0sð1 + iÞ− πIg.
[8]
Here, uð.Þ is the utility function of the child in his or her pre-retirement period,
while υi ð Þsymbolizes the risk utility function in the future period given that the
parent is in the nursing home and υoð.Þ otherwise, with υo > υi and υ′o > υ′i.
Therefore, the child is altruistic to the extent that he or she derives more utility
from a given amount of wealth if the parent is out of the nursing home. His or
her marginal utility is also higher, reflecting increased enjoyment of consump-
tion with a parent who is independent (on a vacation, e.g.).
The FOC is given by
dEU
de
= − θu′ ð Þ+π′ eð Þ υi ð Þ− υo ð Þ =0. [9]
This is a well-known necessary condition for optimal prevention. The first term
of eq. [9] mirrors the certain utility loss associated with additional effort. It is
balanced by the decreased probability of having the parent in the nursing home
weighted by the associated utility loss. Note that the boundary optimum e* = 0
obtains if contrary to the assumption, υo ð Þ > υi ð Þ, i.e. the child does not suffer a
loss of utility when the parent lives in the nursing home, reflecting the absence
of altruism on his or her part. Conversely, given altruism one has υo > υi at the
optimum, regardless of the difference in wealth between the two states. In order
to maintain this inequality as the child’s wealth increases, υ′o > υ′i is required as
well, again regardless of the difference in wealth between the two states.
The slope of the child’s first reaction function de=dI is proportional to
∂2E U
∂e∂I
= π′ðeÞkð1− tÞ ð1− πÞ− r′wð1− πÞp
   υ′i + π  υ′o 
=π′ðeÞkð1− tÞ ð1− πÞð1− r′wpÞ
   υ′i + π  υ′o 
> 0 if r′wp > 1 ðstringent cost sharingÞ since π < 1− π, π′ðeÞ < 0 and υ′i < υ′o
< 0 if r′wp < 1 ðlenient cost sharingÞ since πðr′wpÞ  υ′i < πυ′o with υ′i < υ′o .
[10]
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The slope of the child’s first reaction decreases in absolute value because
π′ðeÞ ! 0  in view of π″ðeÞ > 0 [see panel (a) of Figure 1 for the case of lenient
cost sharing]. As to the child’s second reaction function with slope de=ds, one
obtains from eqs [9] and [8],
∂2E U
∂e∂s
=π′ðeÞkð1− tÞ w0ð1 + iÞ− r′ww0ð1 + iÞp
   υi −w0ð1 + iÞ  υ′o 
= π′ðeÞkð1− tÞw0ð1 + iÞ υ′i − υ′o − r′wp  υ′i
 
.
Using the FOC in eq. [9] to obtain υi ð Þ− υo ð Þ= θu′ ð Þ=π′ eð Þ, this becomes
∂2E U
∂e∂s
= π′ðeÞkð1− tÞw0ð1 + iÞ θu′ ð Þ=π′ eð Þ− r′wp  υ′i
 
=
= kð1− tÞw0ð1 + iÞ θu′ ð Þ−π′ðeÞ  r′wp  υ′i
 
> 0.
[11]
Therefore, the slope de=ds of the child’s second reaction function is positive but
decreasing with e, as depicted in panel (b) of Figure 1. Panels (a) and (b) show
that apart from an unlikely tangency Nash equilibrium, there are two equilibria
(where the two reaction functions intersect), only one of which is stable (G).
3 Nash Equilibria and their Displacement
in the Case of China
In this section, three institutional details characterizing China are introduced to
arrive at specific predictions using the results of comparative-static analysis
developed in the Appendix.
(1) In contradistinction with Courbage and Zweifel (2011) who studied unstable
outcomes with reference to industrial countries, focus this time is on stable
equilibria because in China, becoming an LTC case does not usually entail
a breakup of family ties (Xu and Zweifel 2014).
(2) Formal LTC services are not subsidized in China at present rðÞ= 1½ .
Therefore, the share of LTC expenditure borne by the parent does not
vary with wealth at all, implying r′w = r
″
w =0.
(3) Parental propensity to save s is high in China (Tao Young, Zhang and
Zhous 2011) such that w0sð1 + iÞ > πI, i.e. the savings achieved during retire-
ment exceed the pro-rata premium for private LTC insurance.
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3.1 Higher Initial Wealth of the Parent in the Case
of China (dw0 >0)
The displacement of the parent’s first reaction function is given by eq. (A.1),
∂2EU
∂I∂w0
= − π u″1ð.Þ+ ð1− sÞu″2ð.Þ
 
+ ð1 + iÞ πðeÞð1− πÞ ð− r″wpÞ  υ′i + ð1− r′wpÞ
2  υ″ið.Þ
n o
− ð1−πðeÞÞπ  υ″oð.Þ
n o
>
< 0.
However, due to characteristic No. 2 cited above, the shift of the parent’s first
reaction function simplifies to become
∂2EU
∂I∂w0
= − π u″1ð.Þ+ ð1 + sÞu″2ð.Þ
 
+ sð1 + iÞ πðeÞð1− πÞ  υ″ið.Þ− ð1− πðeÞÞπ  υ″oð.Þ 
> 0 ðsee text belowÞ.
[12]
The crucial expression in brackets is approximately equal to πðeÞð1− πÞ
υ″ið.Þ− υ″oð.Þ  < g υ″ið.Þ− υ″oð.Þ , with 0 < g < 1, provided πðeÞ and π do not differ
too much (on average, π differs from πðeÞ only by the loading. In that event, the first
term of eq. [12], involving the sum u″1ð.Þ+ ð1 + sÞu″2ð.Þ, is almost certain to dominate
the second term involving the difference υ″ið.Þ− υ″oð.Þ because there is no reason to
assume major divergences between u″1ð.Þ, u″2ð.Þ, υ″ið.Þ, and υ″oð.Þ. This implies an
upward displacement of the parent’s first reaction function in panel (a) of Figure 2.
The displacement of the parent’s second reaction function is given by eq. (A.2),
∂2EU
∂s∂w0
= = − ð1− sÞu″2ð.Þ+ ð1 + iÞ πðeÞ − r″wp  υ′ið.Þ+ sð1 + iÞð1− r′wpÞ
2  υ″i
n on
+ ð1−πðeÞÞ  υog >< 0.
In view of characteristic No. 2 once again, it becomes
∂2EU
∂s∂w0
= − ð1− sÞu″2ð.Þ + ð1 + iÞ πðeÞ − r″wp  υ′ið.Þ+ sð1 + iÞð1− r′wpÞ
2  υ″i
n on
+ ð1−πðeÞÞ  υog
= − ð1− sÞu″2ð.Þ + ð1 + iÞ πðeÞsð1 + iÞυ″i + ð1−πðeÞÞ  υ″o
 
< 0
[13]
since risk aversion increases strongly with retirement (Halek and Eisenhauer,
2001), implying υ″i > u″2ð.Þ and υ″o > u″2ð.Þ The reaction function thus shifts
downward [see panel (b) of Figure 2].
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The displacement of the child’s reaction function is given by eq. (A.3),
∂2E U
∂e∂w0
=π′ðeÞsð1 + iÞ ðkð1− tÞðυ′i − υ′oÞ− r′wp  υ′i
 
> 0 since υ′i < υ′o.
Due to characteristic No. 2, this simplifies to
∂2E U
∂e∂w0
= π′ðeÞsð1 + iÞkð1− tÞ υ′i − υ′o  > 0 . [14]
Therefore, the child’s reaction curve moves out when parental wealth
increases, which by itself creates scope for more informal care. However,
Figure 2 results in
Prediction 1 (dw0 > 0):
A higher initial wealth on the part of the parent has a positive effect on his or her
demand for private LTC coverage combined with an ambiguous effect on the
amount of informal care provided by the child. It decreases the saving propen-
sity of the parent combined with an increase in child effort. This renders the
overall effect on child effort ambiguous.
P 
e
0 (a) (b)
C 
G 
C’
I
G‘ 
P
e 
0
C G 
s
1 
G‘ 
P‘ 
P‘ 
Figure 2: Increase in parental wealth (dw0 > 0). (a) Displacement in (I,e)-space,
(b) Displacement in (s,e)-space.
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4.2 Increase in Cost Sharing in the Case of China (dα >0,
∂r=∂α >0)
Here, “increase” is to be understood in terms of a comparison between industrial
countries (with limited cost sharing) and China (with 100% cost sharing as it
were). From eq. (A.4), one has for the first parental reaction function,
∂2EU
∂I∂α
= −πðeÞð1− πÞð1− r′wpÞðr′apÞ  υ″ið.Þ
< 0 if r′wp > 1ðstring ent means testingÞ
> 0 if r′wp < 1ðlenient means testingÞ.
While China is certainly characterized by stringentmeans testing as it were, it is also
true that r′w =0 while r
′
a> 0 compared to industrial countries. Therefore, one obtains
∂2EU
∂I∂α
= − πðeÞð1− πÞðr′apÞ  υ″ið.Þ > 0, [15]
indicating an upward shift in the first parental reaction function [see panel (a) of
Figure 3; note that the shift from G to G’ could conceivably entail a reduction in e].
As to the second reaction function, characteristic No. 2 modifies eq. [16] to become
∂2EU
∂s∂α
= − ð1 + iÞ πðeÞð1− r′wpÞðr′αpÞ  υ″ið.Þ
 
= − ð1 + iÞ πðeÞr′αp  υ″ið.Þ
 
> 0 ,
[16]
G’
C’I 1 P‘ 
s 
e 
0 
(a) (b)
e
0
C
C  P 
P P‘ 
G 
G‘ 
G 
Figure 3: Increase in cost sharing (dα > 0, ∂r=∂α > 0). (a) Displacement in (I,e)-space,
(b) Displacement in (s,e)-space.
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indicating an upward shift [see panel (b) of Figure 3]. The impact on child effort
is given by eq. (A.6),
∂2E U
∂e∂α
=π′ðeÞkð1− tÞð− r′αpÞ  υ′i > 0. [17]
This equation needs no modification; it indicates an outward shift [see panel
(b) of Figure 3].
Therefore, the interaction of the two players gives rise to
Prediction 2 (dα > 0, ∂r=∂α > 0):
In response to an increased cost sharing in LTC expenditure, parental demand
for private LTC insurance is predicted to increase combined with an ambiguous
effect on the amount of informal care provided by the child. The predicted
change in the parent’s propensity to save is positive combined with an increase
in child effort. Therefore, the overall effect on child effort is ambiguous.
Now the two exogenous changes on the child’s side are considered for the
Chinese case.
4.3 Increased Opportunity Cost of the Child in the
Case of China (dθ > 0)
According to eq. (A.7), the parent is not affected, while eq. (A.8) unambiguously
indicates an inward shift of the child’s reaction functions. Therefore, Figure 4 yields
17 
1 
P = P‘ 
e0 
(a) (b)
I 
e
0
s
C
C 
G‘
G 
 C‘ 
P = P‘ 
C‘ 
G‘ 
Figure 4: Higher opportunity cost of the child (dθ > 0). (a) Displacement in (I,e)-space,
(b) Displacement in (s,e)-space.
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Prediction 3 (dθ > 0):
A higher wage rate (or more generally, opportunity cost of time) on the part of
the child is predicted to increase parental demand for private LTC insurance
combined with less informal care provided by the child. The prediction with
respect to the parent’s propensity to save is a decrease, again combined with
less informal care. Thus, there is a crowding-out effect on both parental saving
and child effort.
4.4 Increased Taxation of Inheritance in the Case
of China (dt> 0)
According to eq. (A.9), the parent is not affected. As to the child, eq. (A.10)
indicates in inward shift of the reaction function because of characteristics No. 2
and 3,
∂2E U
∂e∂t
= −π′ðeÞk w0sð1 + iÞ− πIf g  θu′ ð Þ=π′ eð Þ− I − rðÞpf g  υ′i
 
= − k θ w0sð1 + iÞ− πIf g  u′ ð Þ−π′ðeÞI  υ′i
 
< 0 since w0sð1 + iÞ > πI.
[18]
In view of π″ðeÞ > 0, the displacement (in absolute value) is relatively small in for
high values of e. Figure 5 thus results in
1 G‘
G 
P = P‘ 
e0 
(a) (b)
I 
e
0
s
C
C 
G‘
G  
C‘
P = P‘ 
Figure 5: Increased inheritance taxation (dt> 0). (a) Displacement in (I,e)-space, (b)
Displacement in (s,e)-space.
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Prediction 4 (dt > 0):
A higher tax rate on the bequest received by the child is predicted to increase
parental demand for private LTC insurance combined with a reduced amount of
informal caregiving provided by the child. It has a depressing the parent’s
propensity to save, combined again with less child effort. These adjustments
amount to a double crowding-out effect.
5 Comparison with Evidence from China
In 2012, a mailed survey was conducted in Shanghai City, involving 584 persons
between ages 30 and 60 who were representative of the Chinese urban population.
Note that it permits only a partial testing of the predictions, having been designed
to test the theoretical work by Courbage and Zweifel (2011), which does not
consider parental saving. Participants were asked to first wear the hat of a parent
who might be in need of LTC and then to adopt the view of a child who considers
providing informal care. In this latter role, more than 61% wished for their parents
to live independently but with frequent visits, justifying the assumption that
(contrary to the situation common in the West), family ties in China remain intact
in the advent of entry into a nursing home. Hence emphasis in the present work is
on stable outcomes of the interaction between the two players, in contradistinc-
tion with Courbage and Zweifel (2011). Moreover, since most of the respondents
are single children, reflecting China’s one-child policy, the sample fits the two-
player model expounded in the previous sections very closely. Responses were of
two types. The first was, “If as the parent I knew that my child would provide
more/the same/less effort, I would increase/keep constant/decrease my private
LTC insurance coverage”. The second response was of the type, “If as the child I
knew that my parent would have more/the same/less LTC insurance coverage, I
would provide more/the same/less informal care”. For the analysis of “parental”
responses e.g., the ordered probit regression equation read,
ΔInsurP = γ0 + γ1ΔEffortC + γ2ðΔEffortC  ΔWealthPÞ+ γ3ðΔEffortC  ΔHealthPÞ+ γ4
+ ðΔEffortC  ΔOpportcoCÞ+ γ5ðΔEffortC  ΔInheritCÞ+ ðsocioec. char.Þ+ ε,
with “P” denoting parent and “C”, child; the variable labels are self-explanatory.
The survey did not contain any questions about a change in subsidization of LTC
expenditure, which is unknown in China, in order to avoid an excess of hypothe-
tical items. Therefore, entry No. 2 of Table 1 below, “Increased cost sharing”, is to
be understood in comparison with a typical industrial country.
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In a first step, the predictions by Courbage and Zweifel (“CZ” in Table 1) are
compared with those of the present paper (“ZC”). While they correspond closely
in three out of four cases, they contradict each other with regard to the effect of
higher initial parental wealth. Whereas CZ predicted that private demand for
private LTC coverage would fall in combination with a beneficial effect on child
effort, the model presented in this paper (ZC) leads to the prediction of an
increase in LTC insurance combined with an ambiguous effect on child effort.
Therefore, whether admission to a nursing home is seen as a shakeup of family
ties (as in CZ) or not (as here) does matter.
Turning to the evidence from China, the column “XZ” of Table 1, referring
to Xu and Zweifel (2014), shows but partial confirmation of theoretical predic-
tions. With regard to the effect of higher parental wealth (exogenous change
No. 1), it points to a reduction in private LTC insurance (col. 3), thus
Table 1: Overview of predictions and empirical evidence from China.
Exogenous
change
Decreased parental
demand for private LTC
insurance?
Decreased parental
propensity to save?
Decreased informal
care provided by child?
CZ
()
ZC
()
XZ
()
CZ
()
ZC
()
XZ
()
CZ
()
ZC
()
XZ
()
Parent
1. Higher
wealth
dw0 > 0
yes nod yes n.a. yes nod nod ? no
effect
2. Increased
cost sharing,
dα > 0
noa,d nod noc,d n.a. nod yesa yesa nod noc,d
Child
3. Increased
opportunity
cost, dθ > 0
no
effect
nod no
effect
n.a. yes yes yes yes yes
4. Increased
taxation of
inheritance,
dt > 0
no
effect
nod no
effect
n.a. yes ?e yesb yes yes
Notes: CZ: Courbage and Zweifel (2011); ZC: the present paper; XC: Xu and Zweifel (2014).
aThe change actually examined is a change in the amount of subsidy; bThe change actually
examined is a changed share in the bequest; cChina does not currently subsidize LTC expen-
diture, which is equivalent to an extreme increase of cost sharing compared to most western
countries; dBeneficial crowding-in effect; eAn unambiguous prediction obtains only if the child’s
share in the bequest is low initially, which does not apply to China with its one-child families.
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supporting CZ (col. 1) rather than the “crowding-in” prediction of ZC (col. 2).
Possibly respondents to the ZX survey, considering their future as parents,
feared that their children’s high degree of mobility might induce them to
reduce their informal care (in the limit to zero, as in CZ). Yet when wearing
the hat of the child, their responses fail to suggest a reduction in the amount of
informal care (see col. 9).
Compared to most industrial countries, China imposes an extremely high degree
of cost sharing in LTC expenditure bynot subsidizing it at all (changeNo. 3 of Table 1).
The fact that a full 81% of respondents in the XZ survey expressed interest in private
LTC insurance supports the prediction of a beneficial “crowding-in” effect by both CZ
and ZC (see cols. 1, 2, and 3 of Table 1). In addition CZ predicted a crowding out of
informal care provided by the child if LTC subsidization were to be stepped up
(equivalent to a decrease in cost sharing) and hence a crowding-in effect if subsidiza-
tion were to be reduced (possibly to zero). Indeed, the XZ survey finds that 34% of the
respondents acting as children were prepared to host an elderly frail parent in their
crowded Shanghai apartment. In comparison, among respondents representative of
German rural communities, only 7% state they would provide LTC themselves on all
conditions,while 17%would tend towardsprovidingLTC (Blinkert andKlie 2004). The
high degree of willingness to provide informal care in China can be interpreted as a
response to the fact that parents would have to come up for the full cost of formal LTC
services (another reason could be gratefulness for the investment in education many
parents undertake in favor of their children, which could bemodeled as a particularly
high difference υo − υi in eq. [9], resulting in a high value of optimal effort e*).
Turning to an increase in the child’s opportunity cost of providing care (No. 3 in
Table 1), CZ predicted “no change” in parental demand for private LTC coverage
(col. 1) and ZC, a beneficial crowding-in effect (col. 2). On this score, the XZ survey
(col. 3) supports CZ because it does not suggest a significant effect. However, both
theoretical approaches lead to the prediction of a reduced amount of informal care
provided by the child, which is confirmed by the survey (cols. 7, 8, and 9).
The fourth exogenous change examined is an increase in inheritance taxation
(No. 4 of Table 1), which is considered equivalent to a reduced share in the bequest
(as in CZ). According to both CZ and ZC (cols. 1 and 2, this should boost parental
demand for private LTC insurance, yet the XZ survey suggests no effect (col. 3).
However, it does suggest a decrease in the amount of informal care provided by the
child (col. 9), which is predicted by ZC (col. 8) while CZ is ambiguous (col. 7).
The XZ survey does not address changes in the parental saving propensity,
where the present paper predicts reductions in three out of four cases (see col.
5 of Table 1). Therefore, the double crowding-out effect predicted by ZC
(less saving combined with less child effort) cannot be pitted against empirical
evidence yet.
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6 Conclusion and Outlook
Subsidization of LTC expenditure has been suspected of crowding out private
LTC insurance (Brown and Finkelstein 2008), private saving (Gruber and
Yelowitz 1999; Sloan and Norton 1997) as well as informal LTC (Pauly 1990;
Zweifel and Strüwe 1998). However, these contributions do not show that a
crowding out may be the simultaneous outcome of the interaction of the two
players. They also neglect the fact that public LTC benefits typically are means-
tested. The purpose of this paper is to fill these gaps by modeling a parent who
decides about his or her demand for private LTC coverage and propensity to save
in response to the child’s amount of caregiving, and a child who decides about
his or her caregiving in response to the parent’s decisions which affects the size
of the bequest.
Four exogenous changes impinging on the interaction between parent and
child are considered in this paper; two of them characterize the two agents,
while the other two reflect public policy. Predictions generally do not differ
between the modeling approaches of Courbage and Zweifel (2011) (CZ), where
the need for formal LTC (in particular, admission to a nursing home) is asso-
ciated with a breakup of family ties, and the present paper (ZC), where it is not.
The one exception is that CZ predicted that an exogenous increase in parental
wealth (change No. 1 in Table 1) decreases the parent’s demand for private LTC
insurance combined with a positive effect on child effort. By way of contrast, ZC
now predict an increase in LTC coverage combined with an ambiguous effect on
child effort. However, this is intuitive because ZC, referring to China specifically,
is not based on a breakup of family ties, contrary to CZ.
The empirical evidence comes from a survey performed in Shanghai City in
2013; it points to a crowding out of private LTC insurance in response to a
(hypothetical) increase in parental wealth combined with a crowding in of child
effort, thus confirming CZ (change No. 1 in Table 1). On the child’s side, an
increase in his or her opportunity cost was examined (change No. 3 in Table 1).
While CZ predicted no change in the demand for LTC insurance combined with a
reduction of child effort, ZC now predict an increase in insurance demand, again
combined with less child effort. The empirical evidence suggests no effect on the
demand for LTC insurance but a crowding out of child effort. Overall, develop-
ments beyond the control of public policy may well have crowding-out effects
especially on the amount of informal care provided by children.
Turning to public policy, one change that may be considered by govern-
ments under budgetary pressure is stepping up the degree of cost sharing to be
borne by persons in need of formal LTC (change No. 2 in Table 1). The modelling
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approach adopted by CZ led to the prediction, “Increased demand for LTC
coverage combined with less child effort”, the present one, “Increased demand
for LTC coverage combined with an ambiguous effect on child effort”. The
survey responses suggest the conclusion, “More LTC insurance, more child
effort”. Therefore, the crowding-out effect of increased cost sharing on child
effort found by CZ does not seem to apply to China with its (still) strong family
ties. However, the XZ survey indicates that popular opinion in China is strongly
in favor of LTC becoming a part of social insurance, which amounts to its
subsidization, i.e. a decrease rather than an increase in cost sharing. Both
theoretical approaches predict a crowding out of private LTC insurance, likely
combined with an ambiguous effect on informal care provided by the child,
while the survey confirms the first prediction but points to a crowding out of
informal care as well. The other policy change considered is an increase in
inheritance taxation (change No. 4 in Table 1). According to CZ, this would
boost parents’ demand for LTC coverage, with an ambiguous effect on the
amount of informal care provided by their children. The present work agrees
with respect to LTC insurance but predicts a crowd-out of child effort. The
empirical evidence combines “no effect” for LTC insurance with a crowding
out of child effort. In sum, increased taxation of bequests is not devoid of a
crowding-out effect either.
The present work also generates predictions concerning the parental propen-
sity to save in combination with child effort. For the two exogenous changes
affecting the child (increased opportunity cost, increased inheritance taxation), it
finds a double crowding-out effect. For one of the changes affecting the parent
(higher initial wealth), it finds a crowding out of parental saving combined with
an ambiguous effect on child effort; for the other (increased cost sharing), a
beneficial crowding-in effect on parental saving combined with an ambiguous
one on child effort. The survey does not provide empirical evidence in this regards
because it was designed to test the earlier predictions formulated by CZ.
There are several limitations to this work that need to be pointed out. First,
the two players may be more altruistic than modeled here. For instance, the
parent could suffer a utility loss from the opportunity cost of caring borne by the
child, while the child could also derive utility from being with the parent.
Specifically, this would cause the marginal utilities [u′1 and u
′
2 of eq. (2)] to
depend negatively on opportunity cost, resulting in a positive value of
∂2EU=∂I∂θ in eq. [18] and hence an upward shift in the parent’s reaction
function [see panel (a) of Figure 4 again]. As to the child, eq. [9] would contain
an additional positive term involving marginal utilities υ′i ð Þ and υ′o ð Þ which
however would have to depend on opportunity cost θ to make a difference in eq.
(A.8). Barring such a complication, an upward shift of the parent’s reaction
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function would combine with no shift on the child’s side. This would imply that
higher opportunity cost borne by the child results in a more marked increase in
the parental demand for LTC insurance combined with a more marked reduction
of child effort than predicted on the basis of panel (a) of Figure 4.
Second, the model may be extended to comprise three generations, with
ambiguous effects however. On the one hand, the child may also anticipate his or
her own old age, which would be a cause for weakening any crowding-out effect
with respect to effort. On the other hand, the caregiver may have children of his or
her own, causing his or her opportunity cost of time to be particularly high. This
would reinforce crowding-out effects on child effort according to eq. (A.8) and
Figure 4. Another potential shortcoming is that all decision variables are fixed
prior to the possible admission to the nursing home. A more refined analysis
would introduce parental saving before and after admission and a level of child
effort before and after admission on the part of the caregiver. In the latter case, the
two variables could be interpreted in different ways, i.e. actual effort designed to
keep the parent out of the nursing home and simply time spent with him or her.
Also, both the objectives and functional relationships may have to be specified
differently, depending on whether the caregiver is a child, the spouse, or a friend, all
of whom have inheritance prospects that are subject to differing legal norms. As a
first approximation, these norms are reflected in the parameter k, with consequences
similar to those emanating from a change in the taxation of inheritance (see
Prediction 4). Finally, the empirical evidence has its weaknesses because partici-
pantsmade hypothetical statements in response to hypothetical changes rather than
actual decisions in response to actual changes. Moreover, they had to act first as
parents and then as children, which may have taxed their power of imagination
(although being between ages 30 and 60, they were familiar with both roles).
The empirical evidence also has its weaknesses. Especially when acting as the
child, respondents were likely to be subject to a “warm glow” effect (Andreoni 1990),
causing them to state an immutable willingness to provide informal care to their
parents. Filial piety is a highly respected social norm deeply rooted in Confucianism
(Chang and Kalmanson 2010). This norm may be responsible for predicted moral
hazard (and hence crowding-out effects not to be confirmed in some instances).
In spite of these limitations, some of the insights of this research are likely to
be robust. One is that for establishing crowding-out effects (single, double, or
even triple), the interaction between the beneficiary and the caregiver needs to
be studied. Another insight is that the stringency as well as the progressiveness
of cost sharing is of crucial importance when trying to predict the crowding-out
effects especially of an increase in parental wealth and of public policy designed
to relieve the budget by making persons in need of formal care pay a greater
share of LTC expenditure.
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Appendix: Four exogenous changes and their
impact on the reaction functions
In this appendix, the model is subjected first to two exogenous changes on the
parent’s side, viz. an increase in his or her initial wealth ðdw0 > 0Þ and an increase
in the degree of cost sharing in LTC expenditure (dα > 0,∂r=∂α > 0). Twomore changes
relate to the child, viz. an increase in his or her opportunity cost of caregiving
ðdθ > 0Þand a lower amount of inheritance (this is thought to be caused by an
increase in its taxation ðdt > 0Þ.
(1) Higher initial wealth of the parent (dw0 >0)
From eqs [2] and [1], the crucial mixed derivative determining the first parental
reaction function is given by
∂2EU
∂I∂w0
= − π u″1ð.Þ+ ð1− sÞu″2ð.Þ
 
+πðeÞð1− πÞ − r″wsð1 + iÞp  υ′i + ð1− r′wpÞ
2
sð1 + iÞ  υ″ið.Þ
n o
− ð1− πðeÞÞπsð1 + iÞ  υ″oð.Þ
= − π u″1ð.Þ+ ð1− sÞu″2ð.Þ
 
+ sð1 + iÞ πðeÞð1− πÞ ð− r″wpÞ  υ′i + ð1− r′wpÞ
2  υ″ið.Þ
n o
− ð1−πðeÞÞπ  υ″oð.Þ
n o
>
< 0.
ðA.1Þ
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As to the parent’s second reaction function, eqs [6] and [1] imply
∂2EU
∂s∂w0
= − ð1− sÞu″2ð.Þ+ ð1 + iÞ
−πðeÞðr″wpÞ  υ′ið.Þ+ πðeÞð1− r′wpÞ sð1 + iÞ− r′wsð1 + iÞp
 
υ″i + ð1−πðeÞÞ  υ″oð.Þg
= − ð1− sÞu″2ð.Þ+ ð1 + iÞ πðeÞ − r″wp  υ′ið.Þ+ sð1 + iÞð1− r′wpÞ
2  υ″i
n on
+ ð1−πðeÞÞ  υ″og
>
< 0. ðA.2Þ
For the child, one has from eqs. (9) and (8)
∂2E U
∂e∂w0
= π′ðeÞ kð1− tÞsð1 + iÞ− r′wsð1 + iÞp
   υ′i − kð1− tÞsð1 + iÞ  υ′o 
= π′ðeÞsð1 + iÞ ðkð1− tÞ− r′wpÞ  υ′i − ðkð1− tÞυ′o
 
= π′ðeÞsð1 + iÞ ðkð1− tÞðυ′i − υ′oÞ− r′wp  υ′i
 
> 0 since υ′i < υ′o.
ðA.3Þ
(2) Increase in cost sharing (dα > 0, ∂r=∂α >0)
An increase in cost sharing is equivalent to an increase in α causing a change in
the function rðw0sð1 + iÞ, αÞ such that ∂ rðw0sð1 + iÞ, αÞ∂α : = r′α > 0. To make this a pure
upward shift of the cost-sharing schedule without a change in its progressive-
ness, r″αw = r
″
wα =0 is imposed.
On the parent’s side, an exogenous change dα > 0 affects the FOC given by
eq. [2], resulting in a shift of his or her first reaction function as follows [see also
eq. (1)],
∂2EU
∂I∂α
=πðeÞð1− πÞ ð− r″wαpÞ  υ′ið.Þ+ ð1− r′wpÞð− r′apÞ  υ″ið.Þ
 
= −πðeÞð1− πÞð1− r′wpÞðr′apÞ  υ″ið.Þ
< 0 if r′wp > 1ðstringentmeanstestingÞ
> 0 if r′wp < 1ðlenientmeanstestingÞ.
ðA.4Þ
To determine the displacement of the second parental reaction function, one has
from eqs [6] and [1],
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∂2EU
∂s∂α
= ð1 + iÞ πðeÞ ð− r″wαpÞ  υ′ið.Þ + ð1− r′wpÞð− r′αpÞ  υ″ið.Þ
  
= − ð1 + iÞ πðeÞð1− r′wpÞðr′αpÞ  υ″ið.Þ
 
< 0 if r′wp > 1ðstringentmeanstestingÞsince r″wα =0
> 0 if r′wp < 1ðlenientmeanstestingÞsince r″wα =0.
ðA.5Þ
With regard to the child, the direction of the displacement is given by [see
eqs. (9) and (8)],
∂2E U
∂e∂α
=π′ðeÞkð1− tÞð− r′αpÞ  υ′i > 0. A.6ð Þ
Now two exogenous changes on the child’s side are considered.
(3) Increased opportunity cost of the child (dθ > 0)
From eqs. (2), (6), and (1), it is evident that the parent is not affected, hence
∂2EU
∂I∂θ
=0,
∂2EU
∂s∂θ
=0 . A.7ð Þ
As to the child, eqs. (9) and (8) yield
∂2E U
∂e∂θ
= − u′ð.Þ+ eθ  u″ð.Þ < 0 , A.8ð Þ
indicating an inward movement of the reaction curve which becomes more
pronounced for higher values of e.
(4) Increased taxation of inheritance (dt > 0)
An increased rate of taxation (dt > 0) has the effect of reducing the net share of
the caregiver in the bequest. According to eqs. (2), (6) and (1), this does not
affect optimization on the part of the parent, thus
∂2EU
∂I∂t
=0,
∂2EU
∂s∂t
=0 A.9ð Þ
Therefore, there again is no displacement of the parental reaction functions.
Concerning the child’s reaction function, one obtains from eqs. (9) and (8),
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∂2EU
∂e∂t
= π′ðeÞ − k w0sð1 + iÞ+ Ið1− πÞ− rðÞpf g  υ′i + k w0sð1 + iÞ− πIf g  υ′o
 
= − k π′ðeÞ w0sð1 + iÞ− πIf g  ðυ′i − υ′oÞ− π′ðeÞ I − rðÞpf g  υ′i
 
.
Using π′ eð Þ υi ð Þ− υo ð Þ = θu′ ð Þfrom the FOC of eq. (9), this boils down to
∂2EU
∂e∂t
= − k w0sð1 + iÞ − πIf g  θu′ ð Þ −π′ðeÞ I − rðÞpf g  υ′i
 
>
< 0 . ðA.10Þ
In sum, several comparative-static results are ambiguous, precluding predictions
concerning the displacement of Nash equilibria. However, they prepare the
ground for analyzing the case of China in greater detail.
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